

Message Text

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ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 (ISO) W
----- 108506

O P 241904Z JUL 74

FM USDEL MBFR VIENNA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 377

SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE

INFO USMISSION NATO PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY BONN PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY

USNMR SHAPE PRIORITY

USCINCEUR PRIORITY

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 4 MBFR VIENNA 0211

EXDIS

NOFORN

FROM US REP MBFR

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJECT: MBFR: FALL 1974 NEGOTIATING ISSUES:

MESSAGE #4: OVERALL ALLIED TACTICS

FOR THE FALL ROUND

1. BEGIN SUMMARY: THIS MESSAGE CONTAINS THE DELEGATION'S RECOMMENDATIONS REGARDING OVERALL ALLIED TACTICS FOR THE FALL 1974 NEGOTIATING ROUND. THESE TACTICAL SUGGESTIONS ARE BASED ON THE ANALYSIS CONTAINED IN MBFR VIENNA 0189, IN WHICH WE ESTIMATE THAT NO EASTERN MOVEMENT ON MBFR IS LIKELY UNTIL AFTER THE SECOND ROUND OF CSCE IS COMPLETED. WE CONSIDER THAT, NONETHELESS, THE ALLIES SHOULD IN THE FALL SESSION FURTHER DEVELOP THEIR AGREED POSITION WITH THE EAST, ADVANCING CERTAIN SPECIFIC NEW POINTS BUT MAKING THEM CONDITIONAL ON SUBSEQUENT EASTERN RESPONSES. IN THIS WAY, THE GROUNDWORK WOULD BE LAID FOR SUBSTANTIVE MOVEMENT ON

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MBFR AFTER CSCE IS ON THE WAY TO COMPLETION. WHETHER

OR NOT THERE IS A POSITIVE DECISION ON THE USE OF THE NUCLEAR SIGNAL, WE CONSIDER IT DESIRABLE FOR THE ALLIES TO PROCEED WITH THE TACTICS DESCRIBED HERE.

2. OUR RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE STEPS THE ALLIES SHOULD TAKE IN THE FALL FOURN OF THE VIENNA TALKS ARE: (A) TO PRESS THE EAST FOR MOVEMENT ON PHASING AND DEFINITIVE REACTION TO THE ALL-PARTICIPANTS FORMULA PRESENTED BY THE ALLIES PRIOR TO THE AGUST BREAK; (B) TO INDICATE WESTERN WILLINGNESS TO ADJUST THE ALLIED DEFINITION OF GROUND FORCES IN A WAY WHICH WOULD MEET INCONSISTENCIES IN ITS APPLICATION AND REDUCE THE GAP BETWEEN THE OVERALL GROUND FORCE TOTALS OF BOTH SIDES BY APPROXIMATELY 28,000 MEN; (C) TO INFORM THE EAST THAT THERE HAVE BEEN INCREASES IN NATO EVALUATIONS OF TOTAL NATO GROUND FORCE STRENGTH BY ABOUT 14,000 MEN AND OF TOTAL WARSAW PACT GROUND STRENGTH BY ABOUT 27,000 MEN; (D) TO INFORM THE EAST THAT NATO ESTIMATE THAT TOTAL AIR MANPOWER STRENGTH ON BOTH SIDES IS ROUGHTLY EQUAL AND TO THEREBY EMPHASIZE THE NEED TO CONCENTRATE ON REDUCING THE DISPARITY IN GROUND FORCE TOTALS; (E) TO OFFER TO COMPARE NATIONAL TOTALS OF GROUND AND AIR FORCE MANPOWER IN ORDER TO MAKE ANOTHER EFFORT TO OBTAIN EASTERN CONFIRMATION OF THE DISPARITY IN GROUND FORCE MANPOWER AND OBTAIN AN AGREED BASIS FOR REDUCTIONS AND (F) TO PROPOSE A NO INCREASE COMMITMENT ON AIR FORCE MANPOWER OF BOTH SIDES IN THE AREA.

3. DISCUSSION WITH THE EAST OF ALL THESE POINTS IS LIKELY TO LAST ONLY TO MID-OCTOBER OR THE BEGINNING OF NOVEMBER. WE HAVE RECOMMENDED, THAT AT THAT POINT, THE EAST BE INFORMED THAT THE ALLIES ARE WILLING IN PRINCIPLE TO CONSIDER INCLUDING US NUCLEAR CAPACITY IN PHASE I REDUCTIONS OF US FORCES. WE ALSO RECOMMEND THAT WHATEVER THE DECISION ON THE PREDEDING POINT, THE ALLIES CONSIDER TELLING THE SOVIETS THAT THEY WOULD BE WILLING TO INCLUDE AIR FORCE MANPOWER IN REDUCTIONS TO THE COMMON CEILING ON THE CONDITION THAT THE EAST AGREE: (A) TO THE COMMON CEILING CONCEPT; (B) TO TAKE AT LEAST 90 PERCENT OF REDUCTIONS IN GROUND FORCES;

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AND (C) TO MAINTAIN THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN GROUND AND AIR FORCE MANPOWER ON EADH SIDE WHICH WOULD RESULT FROM PHASE II REDUCTIONS. END SUMMARY.

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O P 241904Z JUL 74

FM USDEL MBFR VIENNA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 378

SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE

INFO USMISSION NATO PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY BONN PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY LONDON

USNMR SHAPE PRIORITY

USCINCEUR PRIORITY

S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 4 MBFR VIENNA 0211

EXDIS

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FROM US REP MBFR

I. PHASING

4. WHEN THE VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS RECOMMENCE IN THE WEEK OF SEPTEMBER 16, THE LOGICAL STARTING TACTIC FOR THE ALLIES IS TO RETURN TO THE PHASING ISSUE IN ORDER TO SEE WHETHER THE RECESS HAS BROUGHT A POSITIVE EASTERN REACTION TO THE ALLIED PROPOSAL OF JULY 10 THAT THE NON-US WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS WOULD BE WILLING, IN CONNECTION WITH A PHASE I AGREEMENT, TO UNDERTAKE A COMMITMENT TO REDUCE TO A COMMON CEILING IN PHASE II.

5. OUR PRESENT FORECAST IS THAT THE EAST WILL CONTINUE TO RESIST THE ALLIED POSITION ON PHASING, EVEN AS AMPLIFIED IN THE SUMMER SESSION.

6. IF SO, THERE ARE FEW FURTHER MOVES LEFT FOR THE ALLIES TO MAKE ON THE PHASING ISSUE, SHORT OF SPECIFYING THE EXACT AMOUNTS EACH WESTERN

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EUROPEAN DIRECT PARTICIPANT WOULD REDUCE IN THE SECOND PHASE AND OF UNDERTAKING A COMMITMENT AS TO PRECISELY WHEN THESE REDUCTIONS WOULD BE MADE. HOWEVER, TO TAKE SUCH STEPS WOULD BE TANTAMOUNT TO A DECISION TO REDUCE IN A FIRST REDUCTION AGREEMENT, WHICH IS CONTRARY TO THE PRESENT BASIC POSITION OF THE ALLIES.

7. IN THE EVENT THE EAST CANNOT BE DRAWN OUT FURTHER ON PHASING AFTER A FEW INFORMAL SESSIONS IN SEPTEMBER, PERHAPS THE BEST COURSE WOULD BE FOR THE ALLIES TO PROPOSE A STOCKTAKING OF THE EXACT POSITION OF BOTH SIDES AT THAT TIME ON THE QUESTION OF WHOSE FORCES SHOULD BE REDUCED FROM THE OUTSET. THE ALLIES COULD THEN MOVE ON TO DISCUSSION OF OTHER ISSUES, RETURNING TO THE EFFORT TO REACH A FINAL SOLUTION OF THE PHASING ISSUE AT A LATER STAGE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS ONCE PROGRESS HAS BEEN MADE IN OTHER FIELDS. CONDITIONS FOR A COMPROMISE SOLUTION OF THE PHASING ISSUE MAY THEN BE MORE FAVORABLE ON BOTH SIDES, WHEREAS TO AGREE ON A COMPROMISE SOLUTION UNDER PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES MIGHT BE HIGHLY DIVISIVE IN NATO.

8. OUR REASONS FOR REACHING THIS CONCLUSION ARE AS FOLLOWS: THE SOVIETS HAVE HINTED AT THE POSSIBILITY OF TRADING OFF EASTERN CONCESSIONS ON PHASING FOR WESTERN CONCESSIONS ON THE CONTENTS OF THE MUTUAL REDUCTIONS. THIS POSITION IS CONSISTENT WITH THE SOVIET POSTURE, WHICH APPEARS TO GIVE MAJOR PRIORITY TO EQUITY OF REDUCTIONS AND MAINTENANCE OF THE EXISTING CORRELATION OF FORCES IN THE AREA. ON THE OTHER HAND, THE HIGHEST ALLIED PRIORITY IS ASYMMETRICAL REDUCTION OF GROUND FORCE MANPOWER AND TANKS. THE RATIONALE FOR THIS ALLIED PRIORITY IS THAT ASYMMETRICAL REDUCTIONS RESULT IN A LONG-TERM IMPROVEMENT IN THE FORCE RELATIONSHIPS CONSISTENT WITH US EMPHASIS ON MAINTENANCE BY NATO OF ADEQUATE CONVENTIONAL FORCES.

9. IN CONTRAST TO THOSE MAJOR LONG-TERM OBJECTIVES OF BOTH SIDES, PHASING IS A SHORT-LIVED TACTICAL AND POLITICAL ISSUE INVOLVING THE SEQUENCE OF NATIONAL REDUCTIONS. UNLIKE ASYMMETRICAL REDUCTIONS, PHASING
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ARRANGEMENTS WOULD HAVE NO REMAINING IMPACT AFTER BOTH PHASES HAD BEEN COMPLETED. CONSEQUENTLY, IF, LATER IN THE NEGOTIATIONS, AFTER FULLY DEVELOPING ITS PROGRAM, NATO IS OBLIGED TO REDUCE ITS OBJECTIVES, IT SHOULD BE MORE WILLING TO YIELD ON PHASING ISSUES THAN ON THE CONTENTS OF THE ALLIED REDUCTION PROGRAM.

10. NATO WOULD BE IN A POSITION TO CONSIDER
SIGNIFICANT TRADE-OFFS BETWEEN PHASING AND THE
CONTENT OF THE REDUCTION PACKAGE ONLY LATER IN THE
NEGOTIATIONS AFTER THE NUCLEAR SIGNAL HAS BEEN MADE
AND THE CONTENT OF THE NUCLEAR OPTION HAS BEEN USED.
BY THIS TIME, SOME OR ALL OF THE THE ALLIES ON THEIR OWN
MAY WELL REQUEST INCLUSION IN PHASE I. FOR EXAMPLE,
DUTCH, BRITISH AND BELGIAN PRESSURE FOR REDUCTONS MAY
HAVE FURTHER INCREASED. THE FRG ALSO MAY HAVE REVIVED
ITS INTEREST IN PARTICIPATION IN PHASE I. IF THERE
STILL HAS BEEN NO SIGNIFICANT EASTERN MOVEMENT BY THAT
TIME, THE ALLIES WILL BE FACED WITH THE ISSUE OF WHETHER
THEY SHOULD REDUCE MBFR OBJECTIVES IN ORDER TO GET
AN AGREEMENT AND IF SO, HOW.

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ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /031 W

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O P 241904Z JUL 74

FM USDEL MBFR VIENNA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 379

SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE

INFO USMISSION NATO PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY BONN PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY

USNMR SHAPE PRIORITY

USCINCEUR PRIORITY

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11. IN THAT SITUATION, THE US MIGHT SUPPORT THE DESIRE
OF SOME ALLIES TO TAKE SOME SMALL FIRST PHASE REDUCTIONS
AND INDICATE THAT SUCH A CONCESSION MIGHT BE USED TO

PERSUADE THE SOVIETS TO ACCEPT MORE ASYMMETRY IN GROUND FORCE REDUCTIONS. THE EAST HAS ALREADY INDICATED THAT INCLUSION OF WEST EUROPEAN FORCES ON A SYMBOLIC BASIS WOULD BE ADEQUATE. SUCH A COURSE WOULD NOT SIGNIFICANTLY INTERFERE WITH THE ACHIEVEMENT OF THE US BURDEN-SHARING OBJECTIVE OF PHASE I. BUT THESE ARE CONSIDERATIONS FOR A LATER TIME. IT WOULD BE DIVISIVE TO SEEK ALLIED DECISIONS ON THEM NOW.

II. ASPECTS OF THE COMMON CEILING

12. IF DISCUSSION ON THE PHASING ISSUE IN THE NEXT ROUND TAKES THE COURSE PREDICTED ABOVE, THE ALLIES WILL HAVE TO TURN TO OTHER ASPECTS OF THEIR PROGRAM FOR FURTHER DEVELOPMENT ABOUT THE BEGINNING OF OCTOBER.

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TACTICALLY, THE MOST DESIRABLE TOPIC FOR FURTHER DEVELOPMENT IN SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES WOULD BE VARIOUS ASPECTS OF THE COMMON CEILING.

13. FOLLOWING UP THE LEAD THEY HAVE ALREADY GIVEN THE EAST AND AFTER NATO AGREEMENT ON THIS TOPIC, THE ALLIES COULD START WITH THE DEFINITION OF GROUND FORCES, OPTIMALLY PUTTING FORWARD THE CASE 1 POSITION, WHICH WOULD INVOLVE SUBTRACTING THE POLISH AND CZECHOSLOVAK GROUND AIR DEFENSE TROOPS FROM THE ALLIES' TOTAL OF WARSAW PACT GROUND FORCES. WE BELIEVE THE ALLIES SHOULD MAKE THEIR READINESS TO READJUST THESE TOTALS DEPENDENT ON SOVIET AGREEMENT TO FOCUS REDUCTIONS ON GROUND FORCES. DISCUSSION OF THIS TOPIC WOULD PROBABLY TAKE TWO INFORMAL SESSIONS, BRING US TO MID-OCTOBER.

14. FOR ITS PART, THE EAST IS UNLIKELY TO ACCEPT THE ALLIED CONDITION. IT IS LIKELY, INSTEAD, TO INSIST ON THE INCLUSION OF AIR FORCE MANPOWER IN REDUCTIONS. THE ALLIED NEGOTIATORS IN VIENNA SHOULD BY THEN HAVE AUTHORITY TO GIVE TO THE EAST THE TOTALS FOR AIR FORCE MANPOWER IN THE AREA IN SUPPORT OF THE ARGUMENT THAT INCLUSION OF AIR FORCE MANPOWER DOES NOT OFFSET THE GROUND FORCE DISPARITY.

15. AT THIS POINT, THE SOVIETS ARE LIKELY ONCE AGAIN TO EXPRESS SKEPTICISM ABOUT ALLIED FIGURES. THE ALLIES SHOULD THEN PROPOSE A RECIPROCAL COMPARISON OF NATIONAL TOTALS FOR GROUND AND AIR FORCES. IF THE EAST WILL CO-OPERATE, SUCH A COMPARISON WOULD BE USEFUL BECAUSE IT WOULD IRREFUTABLY DEMONSTRATE THE EXISTENCE OF THE DISPARITY IN GROUND FORCES ON THE BASIS OF AGREED FIGURES.

IT WOULD ALSO PROVIDE AN AGREED BASIS FOR REDUCTIONS.
HOWEVER, THE EAST IS UNLIKELY TO AGREE TO DATA
EXCHANGE AT THIS STAGE IN THE NEGOTIATIONS, IN PART
PRECISELY BECAUSE AN AGREED COMPARISON WOULD PROVIDE
EVIDENCE OF A DISPARITY IN GROUND FORCES.

16. DESPITE THIS, THE EAST WILL PROBABLY CONTINUE TO
MAKE THE CASE FOR INCLUSION OF AIR FORCE IN REDUCTIONS.

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AT THIS POINT THE ALLIES SHOULD BE IN A POSITION TO
PROPOSE A NO-INCREASE COMMITMENT
ON AIR FORCE MANPOWER OF EAST AND WEST IN
THE AREA. DISCUSSION OF THESE POINTS WOULD PROBABLY
TAKE NOT MORE THAN A WEEK OR SO, BRINGING US TOWARD THE
END OF OCTOBER.

17. THE EASTERN REACTION TO THIS PROPOSAL, TOGETHER
WITH THE ALLIED PROPOSAL TO ADJUST THE GROUND FORCE
DEFINITION, AND THE POINT THAT AIR FORCE MANPOWER TOTALS
ON BOTH SIDES ARE SIMILAR, SHOULD PROVIDE A USEFUL INDICATION
OF THE INTENSITY OF EASTERN INTEREST IN THE INCLUSION
OF AIR FORCES IN REDUCTIONS.

IF THE EAST REJECTS A NO-INCREASE COMMITMENT ON AIR
FORCE MANPOWER AS INADEQUATE, THE ALLIES WOULD THEN HAVE
SET THE STAGE FOR A POSSIBLE PROPOSAL TO INCLUDE AIR FORCE
MANPOWER IN REDUCTIONS IN RETURN FOR EASTERN MOVEMENT
TOWARD A COMMON CEILING. THIS COULD BE INTRODUCED
IN THE FALL ROUND, EITHER BEFORE OR AFTER
THE NUCLEAR SIGNAL, AT A POINT TO BE DETERMINED ON TACTICAL
GROUNDS.

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ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /031 W

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FM USDEL MBFR VIENNA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 380
SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
INFO USMISSION NATO PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY BONN PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY LONDON
USNMR SHAPE PRIORITY
USCINCEUR PRIORITY

S E C R E T SECTION 4 OF 4 MBFR VIENNA 0211

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FROM US REP MBFR

III NUCLEAR SIGNAL

18. IN OUR VIEW, THE MAJOR STEP OF SIGNIFICANCE OPEN TO THE ALLIES AT THIS POINT OF THE NEGOTIATIONS WOULD BE TO INDICATE TO THE SOVIETS ALLIED WILLINGNESS TO CONSIDER INCLUDING US NUCLEAR CAPACITY IN REDUCTIONS. THIS TOPIC HAS BEEN DISCRIBED IN MBFR VIENNA 0190.

IV. CONCLUSIONS

19. IF IT IS CORRECT THAT SOVIET RELUCTANCE TO MOVE IN THE MBFR NEGOTIATIONS IS LARGELY DEPENDENT ON THEIR DEISRE TO WAIT AND SEE WHAT THE OUTCOME OF CSCE WILL BE, DEVELOPMENT BY THE ALLIES OF THE PROGRAM SET FORTH ABOVE MIGHT SET THE STAGE FOR SUBSTANTIVE MOVEMENT IN THE MBFR NEGOTIATIONS FOLLOWING CONCLUSION OF THE SECOND PHASE OF CSCE NEGOTIATIONS AND SHOULD PLACE THE ALLIES IN A BETTER POSITION TO REACH AN OUTLINE AGREEMENT BY
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LATE SPRING OF 1975.

20. LEAVING ASIDE THE NUCLEAR SIGNAL, WHICH WE HAVE RECOMMENDED, THE ALLIES WOULD HAVE: (A) MADE A FURTHER EFFORT TO REACH AGREEMENT ON PHASING; (B) INDICATED ON THE BASIS OF OBJECTIVELY EXISTING INCONSISTENCIES A WILLINGNESS TO REDUCE THE GAP IN THE OVERALL GROUND FORCE TOTALS OF BOTH SIDES BY APPROXIMATELY 28,000 MEN; (C) OFFERED TO CONSIDER PLACING LIMITATIONS ON AIR FORCE MANPOWER AND (D) MIGHT HAVE PROPOSED THE INCLUSION OF AIR FORCE MANPOWER IN REDUCTIONS UNDER SPECIFIED CONDITIONS.

21. THIS IS AS FAR AS WE THINK THE ALLIES CAN GO IN

THE DIRECTION OF PREPARING THE GROUND FOR SUBSTANTIAL MOVEMENT IN THE NEGOTIATIONS IN THE SPRING SHORT OF MAKING MAJOR MODIFICATIONS IN THE ALLIED PROGRAM WHICH WE THINK WOULD BE PREMATURE AND MIGHT IN ADDITION BE OPPOSED BY MANY ALLIES ON THE GROUNDS THAT THEY WERE MISTIMED BECAUSE THE EAST WAS MAKING NO MOVEMENT WHATEVER.

22. WITH THE EXCEPTION OF THE INCLUSION OF AIR FORCE MANPOWER IN REDUCTIONS, NONE OF THESE MOVES IS A MAJOR ONE. ALL OF THEM COME UNDER THE HEADING OF LOGICAL DETAILS OF THE PRESENT ALLIED POSITION. DEVELOPMENT OF THIS POSITION WOULD HAVE BEEN COMPLETED BY THE BEGINNING OF NOVEMBER EVEN IF IT WERE DESIRED FOR TACTICAL REASONS TO STRETCH OUT THE TIMING. DURING THIS PERIOD THE SOVIETS WILL HAVE BEEN PRESSING HARD FOR DISCUSSION OF THE SUBSTANCE OF REDUCTIONS. IT IS AT THIS POINT THAT IT WOULD BE MOST DESIRABLE TO MAKE THE NUCLEAR SIGNAL. IF IT IS NOT DONE, THEN THE ALLIES WILL BE LEFT TO MARK TIME FOR THE REMAINING HALF OF THE NEGOTIATING ROUND ON THE BASIS OF AN INCOMPLETE AND LOP-SIDED NEGOTIATING PROGRAM. MOREOVER, THEY WOULD NOT HAVE UTILIZED THE FALL SESSION EFFECTIVELY TO PREPARE FOR POTENTIAL MOVEMENT IN THE SPRING.

23. ALTERNATIVELY, IF SOVIET RELUCTANCE TO MOVE IN MBFR PROVES MORE FUNDAMENTAL THAN A DESIRE TO HOLD BACK FOR THE SAKE OF CSCE, THE FACT THAT THE ALLIES HAD MADE THESE MOVES

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WILL PLACE THEM IN AN IMPROVED POSITION TO DEMONSTRATE CONVINCINGLY TO THE WESTERN PUBLIC THAT THEY HAD TAKEN A CONSTRUCTIVE POSITION IN THE MBFR NEGOTIATIONS AND THAT RESPONSIBILITY FOR ANY CONTINUING DEADLOCK RESTS ON THE EAST.

24. THE NEXT MESSAGE OF THIS SERIES CONTAINS DELEGATION RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE USG DECISIONS NECESSARY TO CARRY OUT THE TACTICAL STEPS DESCRIBED ABOVE.
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